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Abstract
What is the continuing relevance of hermeneutics to legal theory in general and to 
constitutional theory in particular if we are all originalists now? Both seem to be vital 
despite the decline of interest in hermeneutics recently. This article argues for the 
continuing relevance of hermeneutics to both ﬁ elds because of the centrality of issues 
of application and practical reasoning in both. Law seeks to ﬁ nd the meaning of texts 
applied over time; legal texts are truly letters of transit. That we are all originalists, yet 
still have the same sort of interpretive debates we have always had, only indicates the 
continuing need to work on hermeneutic questions of application and practical reason-
ing. These issues are explored in the context of the Dworkin/Scalia discussion of the 
distinction between expectation and semantic originalism.
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Resumo
Qual é a relevância contínua da hermenêutica para a teoria jurídica em geral e para 
a teoria constitucional em particular se todos nós somos originalistas agora? Ambas 
parecem ser vitais, apesar do recente declínio de interesse pela hermenêutica. Este artigo 
discorre sobre a relevância contínua da hermenêutica para ambos os campos devido à 
centralidade das questões de aplicação e raciocínio prático em ambos. O dieito procura 
encontrar o signiﬁ cado dos textos aplicados ao longo do tempo; textos legais são 
verdadeiramente cartas de trânsito. O fato de que nós somos todos originalistas, mas 
ainda temos o mesmo tipo de debates interpretativos que sempre tivemos, somente 
indica a necessidade contínua de trabalhar em questões hermenêuticas de aplicação e 
raciocínio prático. Estas questões serão exploradas no contexto da discussão Dworking/
Scalia a respeito da distinção entre expectativa e originalismo semântico.
Palavras-chave: originalismo, hermenêutica, teoria constitucional, interpretação legal.
1 Northern Kentucky University. Nunn Drive, Highland Heights, KY 41099, USA.
Valauri  |  As time goes by: Hermeneutics and originalism
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 3(1): 56-64                                       57
Introduction
This short article calls for a second look at 
the relevance of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics to current controversies in interpretive 
theory and in legal/constitutional theory. A generation 
ago hermeneutics spoke to issues in these ﬁ elds dealing 
with positivism and intentionalism in interpretation. At 
that time, hermeneutics helped explain the inadequa-
cies of interpretation based on plain meaning and/or the 
intent of the author or framers of texts. However, these 
discussions of and citations to Gadamer and other 
hermeneuts, once common, have since all but vanished 
from the literature. 
Why has hermeneutics thus faded from these dis-
cussions? This has happened, in part, because the issues 
it once spoke to now appear to have been dealt with 
and passed over and, in part, because of criticisms of Ga-
damer’s account of philosophical hermeneutics. For these 
reasons, it is not at all clear what hermeneutics has left to 
say in today’s debates in these areas. In interpretive the-
ory, for example, Derrida has questioned the possibility 
and efﬁ cacy of the “good will to power” assumed in the 
hermeneutic approach (Derrida, 1989, p. 52) and Haber-
mas ha s charged that, “Gadamer’s prejudice for the rights 
of prejudices certiﬁ ed by tradition denies the power of 
reﬂ ection” (Habermas, 1977, p. 335). 
Likewise, i n constitutional theory, “We are all 
originalists, now!” That is to say, we all believe that the 
constitution ought to be interpreted according to its 
original public meaning. Unfortunately, we disagree as 
much as we did before our “agreement” as to how this 
meaning is to be determined and hermeneutics does 
not seem able to help us choose among the varieties of 
originalism that compete for our allegiance. In order to 
command our attention once again, hermeneutics must 
speak to and help us resolve these current concerns. 
Can it? Yes, by getting back to some fundamental her-
meneutic paradigms.
“Hermeneutics,” Gadamer tells us, “is the art of 
agreement” (Gadamer, 1990, p. 273). It seeks this agree-
ment through understanding between different time hori-
zons, between text and interpreter, and among interpret-
ers. “Hermeneutic philosophers,” Hoy tells us, “usually 
engage in constructing theories sufﬁ ciently general to 
account for all kinds of interpretation [.]” (Hoy, 1985, 
p. 136). Two important iss ues arise from these basic 
claims and aims. One is “whether these disciplines share 
a common conception of understanding and interpreta-
tion” (Hoy, 1985, p. 136), which Gadamer and Hoy as-
sume, or at least hope. The second is whether herme-
neutics is descriptive or a normative practice – that is, 
whether it aims to describe what necessarily or always 
happens in interpretation or rather what should happen. 
This article will explore these questions in two 
contexts as they have evolved over the past generation 
or so. The ﬁ rst is the context of general interpretive 
theory construction which Hoy refers to above (which 
we may call “general hermeneutics”) and the second is 
the context of the framers’ intent/originalism debate 
in American constitutional theory (which we may call 
“constitutional hermeneutics”). Both ﬁ elds have seen a 
decreasing interest in Gadamerian philosophical herme-
neutics over that time span for reasons largely relating 
to the important issues mentioned above. 
My aim here in a second look at hermeneutics 
is to examine some debates and developments in these 
ﬁ elds to mutually illuminate and evaluate the claims and 
nature of each. The route to the renewed relevance 
of hermeneutics in these ﬁ elds, I will argue here, lies 
in what Gadamer calls “the recovery of the funda-
mental hermeneutic problem.”2 This “back to basics” 
move means doub ling down3 on three hermeneutic 
paradigms—the pr ocess of application (Gadamer, 1989, 
p. 307-311), Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom (Ga-
damer, 1989, p. 312-324), and legal hermeneutics (Ga-
damer, 1989, p. 324-341), which constitute what might 
be called the Aristotelian face of philosophical herme-
neutics at the expense of its universal, linguistic, and on-
tological aspects, which may be called the Heideggerian 
face of hermeneutics. In doing this, we pull back from 
Gadamer’s well-known assertion that, “Fundamentally I 
am not proposing a method; I am describing what is the 
case” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 512). This statemen t encapsu-
lates the ontological or descriptive aspect of herme-
neutics, while the three fundamental elements treated 
here emphasize the normative and practical aspect. Is 
this hermeneutic heresy? No, it is rather application and 
evolution while maintaining ﬁ delity to the fundamental 
claims and the perennial problems of the practice that 
has always characterized the development of herme-
neutic theory.
2 This is, of course, the title of a central section of Gadamer’s Truth and Method (see Gadamer 1989, p. 307-341).
3 “Doubling down” is a gambling term which has ﬁ ltered into other, not unrelated, ﬁ elds, especially politics and journalism. One glossary deﬁ nes “double down” in this 
way: “In blackjack, it is the player’s option to double their original bet in exchange for receiving only one more card. To do this the player turns over their ﬁ rst two cards 
and places an equal bet alongside the original bet.” Available at: http://www.casino-on-line-glossary.co.uk/gambling-advice/d/double-down.html.
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Constitutional hermeneutics 
Letters of transit
The differences between the positions and theo-
ries discussed in the article are often subtle and abstract. 
As an expository device, then, I have taken as my title a 
famous song, As Time Goes By4, which is most commonly 
associated with a famous movie, Casablanca (Koch, 1973, 
p. 109). The song title is contained in the song’s best-
known lyric, “The fundamental things apply, as time goes 
by.” In discussing hermeneutics and interpretation, I shall 
return to this lyric three times in the course of this ar-
ticle, not because its meaning is clear, but rather because 
it is ambiguous. Of the multiple readings of this lyric, I 
will examine three in this article. In this section on con-
stitutional/legal hermeneutics the focus is one reading 
of this lyric—that according to the theory of meaning 
and interpretation, there is always a settled, core mean-
ing and applications which can vary from case to case. 
This idea was well captured in American con-
stitutional law by Justice Sutherland in 1926 when he 
wrote, “[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties 
never varies, the scope of their application must expand 
or contract to meet the new and different conditions 
which are constantly coming within the ﬁ eld of their op-
eration” (see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 1926 , p. 387). 
This separation between meaning and application, philo-
sophical hermeneuts counter, cannot be maintained. As 
Hoy puts the point, “Understanding is always already 
interpretation, Gadamer maintains, and interpretation is 
always already application.”5 
From Sutherland’s perspective the me aning of 
the Constitution is also ﬁ xed, in large part, by the in-
tent of the constitutional framers and adopters, “[T]
he whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision 
of the Constitution, is [...] to ascertain and give effect 
to the intent of the framers and the people who ad-
opted it.”6 This view of constitutional interpret ation has 
come be known as strict intentionalism (see Brest, 1980, 
p. 204) or interpret ivism.7
A generation ago this strict intentio nalism or 
interpretivism competed with a view, not surprisingly, 
called noninterpretivism, deﬁ ned by Ely as “the contrary 
view that courts should... enforce norms that cannot be 
discovered within the four corners of the document” 
(Ely, 1980, p. 1). Typically, this inv olves a moral, rather 
than a textual or historical, reading of the provisions of 
the constitution, which is to say applying some theory 
of equality, liberty, or fairness to the abstract values 
embodied in the open-ended clauses of the document. 
Nonoriginalists also often employ the metaphor of the 
living constitution, in contrast to the dead hand of the 
framers that is part of originalism. 
Turning to the movie Casablanca once again, re-
call that many of the characters in that movie sought 
letters of transit to get themselves out of Casablanca 
and ultimately to the United States. Let us take up this 
phrase here and employ it to articulate the hermeneu-
tic critique of the interpretivism/noninterpretivism de-
bate of a generation ago to make the point that both 
views overlook the important hermeneutic point that 
eminent texts like the Constitution are themselves let-
ters of transit bridging the temporal, historical distance 
between the time of adoption and the present day and, 
for this reason, have a history, tradition, and trail of prec-
edent which condition their meaning and application.8 
These positions neglect this hermeneu tic point and as-
sume either, in the case of originalism, that this distance 
can be objectively and completely bridged, or in the case 
of nonoriginalism, that it need not be bridged at all—Jus-
tice Brennan, for example, spoke of “contemporary rati-
ﬁ cation” of the constitution in opposing the ﬁ rst wave 
of originalists (Brennan, 1985-1986, p. 433). 
To state the hermeneutic critique of originalism 
in terms of dueling metaphors, one might say that origi-
nalism, like romantic hermeneutics before it, sees textual 
interpretation as a matter of reproducing the thoughts 
of the framers, of getting inside their heads, seeking, as 
Gadamer states it, to “understand a writer better than he 
understands himself” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 192).  Gadamer’s 
he rmeneutic approach, in contrast, sees interpretation 
as a form of conversation, a back and forth of question 
4 The song was written by Tin Pan Alley songwriter Herman Hupfeld and ﬁ rst appeared in the short-running 1931 Broadway show Everyone’s Welcome. For more on 
the song and its history (see Steyn, 2008, p. 172-178).
5 See Hoy (1985, p. 139). Gadamer (1989, p. 308) himself says, “Thus we are forced to go one step beyond romantic hermeneutics, as it were, by regarding not only 
understanding and interpretation, but also application as comprising one uniﬁ ed process.”
6 In these sense, see Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934, p. 398) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
7 Ely (1980, p. 1). Which John Ely described as the view that, “[J]udges deciding constitutional issues should conﬁ ne themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or 
clearly implicit in the written Constitution.”
8 Hoy (1985, p. 147). As Hoy remarks, “Central to hermeneutic theory, but most susceptible to the charge of historical relativism, is the thesis that the interpretation
of a work is invariably conditioned by the prior history of effects of that work.”
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and answer, on the model of the Platonic dialogues (see 
Ga damer, 1989, p. 362-369) Gadamer’s approach rec-
ognizes, but attempts to bridge, the distances between 
writer/framer and interpreter.9
Originalism, seemingly, fails as a th eory of consti-
tutional interpretation on several fronts. First, at least in 
its strict intentionalist form, it requires us to discover 
psychological information about the framers that may 
be unobtainable today and then it asks us to combine 
this psychological information into a group intent that 
may well have never existed.10 Second, even if this group 
intent can be divined, it may well produce case results 
which are today unacceptable.11 Originalism is embar-
rassed by reprehe nsible decisions with originalist ele-
ments, such as the Dred Scott case12 while it implausibly 
argues for origi nalist justiﬁ cations for universally accept-
ed decisions, such as Brown v. Board of Education,13 which 
have little evident originalist underpinning. Ironically, 
the Brown opinion itself presents a better hermeneutic 
parry of originalist objections to its result than does 
the secondary literature in the law reviews. Confront-
ing evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the 
framers, Chief Justice Warren says simply, “[W]e cannot 
turn the clock back to 1868 when the amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was 
written. We must consider public education in the light 
of its full development and its present place in American 
life throughout the Nation.”14 Alexander Bickel adds the 
gloss that  the Court’s language presents “an awareness 
on the part of the framers that it was a constitution they 
were writing, which led to a choice of language capable 
of growth” (Bickel, 1955, p. 1-63). 
Nonoriginali sm failed simply because it was an 
oxymoron—constitutional theory is concerned with 
constitutional interpretation which nonoriginalism, by 
its very deﬁ nition, is not.15 This resulted, as we shall see, 
not i n the death of this view, but rather, a morphing of it 
into varieties of originalism!
We are all originalists now!
Reports of the death of originalism (and nonorig-
inalism, for that matter) have turned out to be, despite 
the various shortcomings of these theories, quite pre-
mature. True, one hears few proponents of strict inten-
tionalism nowadays. And many former nonoriginalists 
make at least a show of paying attention to the consti-
tutional text. One important thing has changed, though. 
Many of the old disputes continue, it is true, but they 
do so under the umbrella of originalism. So, commenta-
tors can now say with little exaggeration that, “We are 
all originalists now!”16 But along with this expansion of 
orig inalism has come a Balkanization (not to mention 
a Balkinization17) of that constitutional theory. No lo n-
ger is there a sharp line separating originalism and living 
constitutionalism. Some writers even combine the two 
theories into aspects of one theory (Colby and Smith, 
2008). Jack Balkin, for example, now holds that, “[T]he 
debate between originalism and living constitutionalism 
rests upon a false dichotomy” (Balkin, 2007, p. 291). This 
error, ac cording to Balkin, is brought about by a conﬂ a-
tion to two quite different things—“the original meaning 
of the constitutional text as opposed to its original ex-
pected application” (Balkin, 2007, p. 291). 
A generation  ago, originalists and nonoriginalists 
differed over whether or not one should give “binding 
authority to the text of the Constitution or the inten-
tions of its adopters” (Brest, 1980, p. 204). In the current 
 debate, originalists generally hold that, “a judge commit-
ted to the original understanding requires [...] that the 
text, structure, and history of the Constitution provide 
him not with a conclusion but with a major premise.”18 
9 Dworkin (1986, p. 62). Ronald Dworkin praises Gadamer, “whose account of interpretation as recognizing, while struggling against, the constraints of history strikes 
the right note.”
10 For an inﬂ uential diagnosis and description of these difﬁ culties with strict originalism (Brest, 1980, p. 204).
11 Scalia (1989, p. 849-861). As Justice Scalia notes, “I can be much more brief in describing what seems to me the second most serious objection to originalism: In its 
undiluted form, at least, it is medicine that seems too strong to swallow. Thus, almost every originalist would adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis.”
12 Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856, p. 393) (upholding slavery in the territories and denying the citizenship of African-Americans).
13 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring racial segregation in the public schools unconstitutional). For an article developing these points about both cases. see Burt (1989, p. 1).
14 347 U.S. at 492-93.
15 For a pointed statement of this argument, see Van Alstyne (1983, p. 217).
16 Google the phrase and you will even get hundreds of hits. It is even used sarcastically--the ultimate proof that it has passed into general usage. See Conway and 
McIntosh (1999) (mocking the White House’s portrayal of Judge Sotomayor as a “nonideological and restrained judge” in a memo sent to Republican senators during 
her Supreme Court conﬁ rmation hearings).
17 Fleming (2007, p. 10). I owe both the phrase and the pun to James Fleming, who when commenting on both the fracturing of the enlarged originalist camp and the 
recent entry of longtime living constitution proponent Jack Balkin (whose blog is called Balkinization) into the originalist fold said, “[W]e are all originalists now. Indeed, 
we are witnessing the Balkanization of originalism (as well as the Balkinization of it).”
18 Bork (1990, p. 162). As evidence of the congeniality of this deﬁ nition to contemporary originalists, Fleming (2007, p. 12-13) gives the quotation and asks readers to 
guess from a list of originalists of various stripes who the author was.
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They differ, however, over the conten t, derivation, and 
explication of that “major premise.” This will involve an 
examination of the original meaning/original expected 
application made by Balkin and others, which is not new 
with Balkin, but rather goes back to early critics of origi-
nalism a generation ago. Paul Brest, for example drew a 
similar distinction between strict and moderate origi-
nalism in 1980 (Brest, 1980, p. 222-224). Brest’s strict 
 originalism tracks Balkin’s expected application origi-
nalism, while his moderate originalism (which looks at 
the general purpose of a constitutional provision rather 
than its expected application) parallels Balkin’s original 
meaning originalism, something which is not clear from 
the name Balkin gives it. 
Putting the matter more clearly still, Balkin de-
scribes his interpretive approach as “the method of text 
and principle” (Balkin, 2007, p. 294). But even this  de-
scription leaves important questions (e.g., how to derive 
and apply principle) unresolved. To pursue this matter 
further, we turn to much the same distinction discussed 
by Antonin Scalia and Ronald Dworkin as the distinction 
between semantic originalism19 and expectation origi-
nalism.20 Dworkin draws this distinction in res ponse to 
Justice Scalia’s statement that, “We look for a sort of 
‘objectiﬁ ed’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person 
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside 
the remainder of the corpus juris” (Scalia, 1997, p. 3-17).
The purpose o f Dworkin’s proffered distinction 
between semantic and expectation originalism is not 
to reject Scalia’s statement of approach, but rather to 
get him to further clarify and specify it. How would the 
two differ in practice? The example Dworkin gives is the 
constitutionality of public school segregation under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(the focus of the Brown v. Board of Education case). Ex-
pectation originalism would uphold the constitutionality 
of public school segregation because “[T]he majority of 
the members of Congress who voted for that amend-
ment did not expect or intend it to have that conse-
quence: they themselves sustained racial segregation 
in the schools of the District of Columbia” (Dworkin, 
1997, p. 119). But their sem antic intention, what they 
actually said, (“equal protection of the laws”) leads to 
the contrary result.
Dworkin next offers “two clarifying translations” 
of semantic originalism—actual practices of the day and 
abstract principle (Dworkin, 1997, p. 120). Justice Scalia 
accepts Dworkin’s distinction between expectation and 
semantic originalism and agrees that they are both se-
mantic originalists (Scalia, 1997, p. 144). But he rejects 
Dworkin’s “two clarifying translations” as a distortion 
of views like his. His view, he says, is based not on the 
practices of the day, but rather it is “rooted in the moral 
perceptions of the time” (Scalia, 1997, p. 145). 
The differenc e between the two men can be 
best further explained in terms of an earlier distinction 
drawn by Dworkin in his discussion of constitutional 
interpretation—the distinction between concepts and 
conceptions (Dworkin, 1978, p. 134-136). The use of 
this distinction is to differentiate between a theory like 
Scalia’s which holds that a constitutional provision em-
bodies a particular conception or version of a moral 
concept (in the Brown example, Scalia holds the Equal 
Protection Clause embodies the view of equality “root-
ed in the moral perceptions of the time.”) and a theory 
like Dworkin’s which holds that the clause embodies the 
best moral/political theory of equality we have today. 
This disagreement is the central issue of the current 
originalism debate, at least for our purposes here, and 
is an important issue I seek to explore in the remainder 
of this article.
Dialogues with the dead
Before suggesting a way of hermeneutically ad-
judicating the disagreement between Scalia and Dwor-
kin over their conﬂ icting versions of semantic original-
ism, let us brieﬂ y examine two criticisms of Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics that complicate the task of 
using his dialogic approach for this purpose. For even if 
it is granted that the dialogic or reciprocal approach to 
constitutional interpretation on offer from philosophi-
cal hermeneutics answers several difﬁ culties raised by 
an originalist account of constitutional interpretation, 
especially in its strict intentionalist interpretive form, 
hermeneutics nevertheless has serious problems of its 
own. One signiﬁ cant problem of the conversational her-
meneutic model is that it is not and cannot be truly 
conversational when applied to old, eminent texts such 
as the Constitution. In a normal conversation there are 
two or more interlocutors present and each is able to 
hold up his own side in the verbal give and take of actual 
conversation. Interpretation of old, eminent texts on 
the hermeneutic model is, in contrast, a dialogue with 
the dead. There can be no true exchange of thoughts, 
19 As Dworkin (1997, p. 115-119) deﬁ nes it, semantic originalism “insists that the rights-granting clauses be read to say what those who made them intended them to say.”
20 “Which holds that these clauses should be understood to have the consequences that those who made them expected them to have” (Dworkin, 1997, p. 115-119).
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21 “[T]here are problems of interpretation because the relation writing-reading is not a particular case of the relation speaking-hearing in the dialogic situation” (Ricoeur, 
1974, p. 95).
22 I will be discussing only one main criticism from each theorist, the one I take to be most telling and most important, rather than all the criticisms they make of Ga-
damer, which, especially in Habermas’ case, are extensive.
23 Derrida (1989, p. 52). The editors of the English translation of the proceedings refer to “the problematical phenomenon we have called ‘the Gadamer-Derrida en-
counter.’” The editors speak in this way because the interchange between Gadamer and Derrida can scarcely be called a debate, let alone a conversation, because of 
their failure to join issue.
24 “This hermeneutic consciousness proves inadequate in the case of systematically distorted communication: incomprehensibility is here the result of a defective 
organization of speech itself” (Habermas, 1980, p. 191).
25 “Freud has drawn on the experience of systematically distorted communication in order to demarcate a sphere of speciﬁ cally incomprehensible expressions” (Habermas, 1980, p. 191).
no questioning from the other, no critical resistance be-
cause there is only one live speaker.21
What does this mean? Let me answer with an-
other cinematic illustration: in Casablanca, when Rick, the 
protagonist, asks to speak to Signor Ugarte, the man who 
ﬁ rst stole the letters of transit by killing the German cou-
riers who were carrying them and was himself then ar-
rested by the Germans, the German Major Strasser replies, 
“You would ﬁ nd the conversation a triﬂ e one-sided. Signor 
Ugarte is dead” (Koch, 1973, p. 109). The dialogic pr oblem 
we confront in the remainder of this article is how to 
prevent the hermeneutic interpretive conversation from 
becoming “a triﬂ e one-side” itself. Without an adequate 
answer to this question, the conversational metaphor will 
not carry us very far. A theory, it seems, is only as good as 
its metaphors. The metaphors in the theory of interpreta-
tion apply mainly to explaining and working through the 
tensions between values of ﬂ exibility and constraint and 
ﬁ delity and a critical perspective. In a successful actual con-
versation, the interlocutors work this out as they go be-
tween themselves. The interpreter of eminent texts must 
perform both roles, it seems, herself.
In this part of the article, I will look at the effect of 
the “triﬂ e one-sided” conversation of interpretive  theory 
by looking at criticisms of Gadamer’s hermeneutics raised 
by Jacques Derrida and Jurgen Habermas.22 They both 
ﬂ ow from a second possibl e understanding of my title lyric, 
“The fundamental things apply, as time goes by.” This read-
ing springs from Gadmer’s assertion that, “Fundamentally I 
am not proposing a method; I am describing what is the case” 
(Gadamer, 1989, p. 512). The reading  concludes from the lyric 
and the assertion that hermeneutics just happens, that the 
fundamental things will always already apply without any par-
ticular skill or effort. Put this way, Gadamer’s assertion seems 
to be an exaggeration, at best. Derrida’s main criticism here 
is that any agreement that arises out of this hermeneutic 
dialogue with the dead is little more than the concealed will 
of the (live) interpreter. Habermas’ primary criticism is that, 
because of its focus on dialogic agreement, hermeneutics 
cannot achieve sufﬁ cient critical distance and attitude. 
In Jacques Derrida’s 1981 “encounter”23 with Ga-
damer, he posed three questio ns to the hermeneut. All 
three revolve around the notion of good will and its 
role in interpretation. In the ﬁ rst question Derrida asks, 
“What is the will if, as Kant says, nothing is absolutely 
good except the good will?” (Derrida, 1989, p. 52). In the 
second he asks, “What to do about the good will—the 
condition for consensus even in disagreement—if one 
wants to integrate a psychological hermeneutics into 
a general hermeneutics?” (Derrida, 1989, p. 52). And in 
the th ird he says, “[O]ne needs to ask whether the 
precondition for Verstehen, far from being continuity of 
rapport […] is not rather the interruption of rapport, 
a certain rapport of interruption, the suspending of all 
mediation?” (Derrida, 1989, p. 53). After these q uestions 
concerning good will, Derrida concludes, “I am not con-
vinced that we ever really do have this experience that 
Professor Gadamer describes, of knowing in dialogue 
that one has been perfectly understood or experiencing 
the success of conﬁ rmation” (Derrida, 1989, p. 54).
The sum of De rrida’s questions and conclusion 
is a denial that Gadamer actually describes “what is the 
case” in interpretation, but only what might occur in 
some ideal, perhaps unattainable, situation, one limited 
to the presence of the only absolutely good thing, the 
good will. This amounts to a denial of the ontologi-
cal and universal claims (i.e., the Heideggerian face) of 
philosophical hermeneutics. Derrida presents psycho-
analysis as a counterexample to Gadamer’s picture of 
hermeneutics as the art of agreement. In psychoanalysis, 
the analyst is presumably not seeking to come to under-
standing and agreement with the patient, but something 
quite the contrary—to get the patient to see the distor-
tion in their own beliefs.
Likewise, Habermas doubts the universality of 
hermeneutic understanding while presenting a psycho-
analytic counterexample. He charges that, “Hermeneu-
tic consciousness remains incomplete as long as it does 
not include a reﬂ ection upon the limits of hermeneutic 
understanding” (Habermas, 1980, p. 181). For Haberma s, 
the prime limit on hermeneutic understanding is posed 
by what he calls “systematically distorted communica-
tion.”24 He points to Freud’s account of psyc hoanalysis 
as an example of this limit.25 
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The point of the use of psychoanaly sis by Der-
rida and Habermas to demonstrate the limitations of 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as a vehicle of in-
sight and critique is perhaps most simply and effectively 
summarized by a 2007 Mankoff cartoon (The New Yorker, 
2007, p. 92), in which at the end of a session a forlorn 
patient is sitting at the edge of the couch. The notepad 
holding analyst leans forward to him and says to the pa-
tient, “Look, making you happy is out of the question, but 
I can give you a compelling narrative for your misery.” 
Doubling down
The grand issue in legal and constitutional inter-
pretation is always how to go forward and apply the law 
or constitution to the next case in a manner that dem-
onstrates ﬁ delity to text and tradition while, at the same 
time, paying sufﬁ cient attention to both larger values 
and the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 
Interpretation must be able to identify the underlying 
relevant principles and implement them at the proper 
level of generality and with the proper respect for tra-
dition and precedent. Stated simply, interpretation is 
always a question of judgment. Judgment, in turn, is a 
matter of experience and virtue, rather than of method 
or rote application of rules. But how can judgment help 
us decide between the “two clarifying translations” con-
cerning which Dworkin and Scalia disagree and can it 
answer the charges of bad will and lack of critical dimen-
sion that Derrida and Habermas raise?
The answer lies in a getting back to basics in 
hermeneutics or, as Gadamer puts it, “the recovery of 
the fundamental hermeneutic problem” (see Gadamer, 
1989, p. 307-341). More speciﬁ cally, this means doubling 
down on the centrality of application, Aristotle and law in 
hermeneutics. These constitute the core or fundamental 
problematic for Gadamer. It might be useful to consider 
why this is so. Why these three and not, say, literature, art, 
or history (or psychoanalysis, for that matter)? 
Application, Aristotle, and law share several im-
portant features which underlie Gadamer’s account of 
philosophical hermeneutics, features which are not so 
prominent, if they are present at all, in other interpre-
tive ﬁ elds discussed by Gadamer and other hermeneuts. 
Above all, they are practical. Because of this, they are 
action-guiding26. They are not merely verbal or theor eti-
cal. For this reason, they are present-oriented27 and not 
merely historical in focus.  They are holistic, concerned 
with the general and the particular, rules and ends, not giv-
ing absolute priority to any element. They are also holistic 
because they are self-interpretive, that is, they involve and 
effect not only the particular decision or act in the par-
ticular instant case or situation, but rather the larger self-
understanding of the individual and social group.
Application is necessary simply because herme-
neutic interpretation is unlike normal conversation. Ga-
damer recognizes this point28 and answers the “dialogue 
with the d ead” problem with these hermeneutic fun-
damentals, which is not say that they are foolproof, but 
rather that they are the models to follow if one wishes 
to interpret well. 
While application requires judgment, judgment 
in turn requires practical wisdom and virtue. This is 
where Gadamer’s discussion turns from application to 
Aristotle, who explains the interrelation of practical 
wisdom, virtue and character.29 Gadamer sums it up 
in this way, “[T] he basis of moral knowledge in man is 
orexis, striving, and its development into a ﬁ xed de-
meanor (hexis). The very name ‘ethics’ indicates that 
Aristotle bases arête on practice and ‘ethos’” (Gadam-
er, 1989, p. 312). According to  Aristotle, moral knowl-
edge and virtue arises from practice and not theory. 
He says, [M]oral virtue comes about as a result of 
habit” (Aristotle, 1980, p. 228).
Moral knowl edge is not factual or theoreti-
cal knowledge (i.e., knowing that), but rather practical 
knowledge (know how)—it manifests itself in the doing.30 
As between Scalia and Dworkin, then, in the 
choice between treating a shared ethos as a moral con-
ception or a moral concept, both Aristotle and Gadam-
er come closer to Scalia and moral conception because 
that approach more approximates the shared virtue, 
habit, and practice they see as key to hermeneutic in-
26 Discussing Aristotle and moral knowledge, Gadamer (1989, p. 317) says, “[W]e are always already in the situation of having to act”.
27 In this way, but not in all ways, they are like Dworkin’s “law as integrity” which “begins in the present and pursues the past only so far as and in the way its contem-
porary focus dictates” (Dworkin, 1986, p. 27).
28 “That is not to say, of course, that the hermeneutic situation in regard to texts is exactly the same as that between two people in conversation. Texts are ‘enduringly 
ﬁ xed expressions of life’ that are to be understood; and that means that one partner in the hermeneutical conversation, the text, speaks only through the other partner, 
the interpreter” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 387, citation omitted).
29  “Virtue, then, is a state of character, concerned with choice, lying in a mean […] that being determined by a rational principle, and that principle by which the man of 
practical wisdom would determine it” (Aristotle, 1980, p. 38).
30  “For we can only apply something that we already have; but we do not possess moral knowledge in such a way that we already have it and then apply it to speciﬁ c 
situations” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 317).
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terpretation31. Moreover, they provide a plausible w ay in 
which to try to bridge the temporal and other distances 
between framers and current interpreters. 
Philia (variously translated as love or friendship—
it is one of many Greek terms with no precise English 
equivalent) also plays an unexpected, but important role 
here in helping answer questions involving dialogues with 
the dead and good will. Three points Aristotle makes 
about friendship are of most relevance here. The ﬁ rst is 
that a man views “his friend as another self” (Aristotle, 
1980, p. 228). The second  is that he sees friendship as a 
kind of active and strong goodwill (Aristotle, 1980, p. 230-
231). And the third is that, “Concord also seems to be
a friendly relation” (Aristotle, 1980, p. 231). These point s 
taken together and combined with the earlier description 
of virtue, character, and practical wisdom act as a reply 
to the criticisms of bad will and conservatism brought 
against Gadamer by Derrida and Habermas. 
Let us turn, ﬁ nally, to the exemplary status of le-
gal hermeneutics for Gadamer. Legal hermeneutics dif-
fers from other sorts of interpretation, Gadamer says, 
because of its “dogmatic purpose” (Gadamer, 1989, 
p. 325). To put this l ess ponderously, we can say that 
it has a friendly relationship with the legal text and its 
framers, as opposed to the suspicious attitude taken in 
the psychoanalytic counterexample offered by Derrida 
and Habermas. There is no reason that different sci-
ences or practices cannot have different purposes and, 
therefore, different attitudes in interpretation.
Legal hermeneutics for Aristotle and Gadamer is 
no uncritical slave to the text and original understanding of 
the law (although these will be the presumptive guides of 
the law). Equity, for example, stands as a corrective to law 
based upon justice. As Aristotle says, “[T]he equitable is just, 
but not the legally just but a corrective of legal justice.”32 
This model of legal interpretation is more situation-sensi-
tive and, so, at once both more and less expansive than the 
text and principle originalism of Dworkin or Balkin. 
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued for an emphasis on 
the Aristotelian face of philosophical hermeneutics in 
what is perhaps an excessively abstract way, which is 
a defect in a theory calling for a practical approach to 
interpretation. Let me make some minor amends for 
that by closing with an imagined dialogue between a 
constitutional framer (call her Ilsa) and a contemporary 
interpreter (call him Rick) inspired by a famous scene in 
Casablanca (Koch, 1973, p. 174-175):
Rick: You s aid I was to do the thinking for both of us 
and it all adds up to one thing.
Ilsa: You’re only saying it to make me go. 
Rick: I’m saying it because it’s true. Inside of us we both 
know it’s true. 
Ilsa: But what about us?
Rick: We’ll always have Philadelphia. We lost it until you 
came to Casablanca. We got it back last night.
Ilsa: And I said I’d never leave you.
Rick: And you never will. I’ve got a job to do. Where I’m 
going you can’t follow. What I’ve got to do, you can’t be any 
part of. Ilsa, I’m not very good at being noble, but it doesn’t 
take much to see that the intentions of three framers don’t 
amount to a hill of beans in this world. Someday, you’ll 
understand that…. Here’s looking at you, kid.
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